Charles Alan Wright and the Fragmentation of Federal Practice and Procedure by Tobias, Carl
Charles Alan Wright and the Fragmentation of
Federal Practice and Procedure
Carl Tobias
t
Charles Alan Wright's preeminent treatise, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure, is both an eloquent testament to his capacious intellect and an enduring
legacy of the brilliant scholar.' Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg recently characterized Professor Wright as a "Colossus [who]
stands at the summit of our profession" and declared that "all who practice the
lawyer's craft profit from his prodigious production."2 She also praised the
54-volume compendium as "by far the most-cited treatise in the United States
Reports [and] the procedural Bible for federal judges and those who practice in
our federal courts."
3
Charles Alan Wright exercised a monumental command of the complex, dy-
namic, and arcane field that is federal practice and procedure. For one half-century,
no comer of this sprawling, byzantine area was insufficiently significant to pique
the scholar's curiosity or escape his enormous grasp. Throughout the field, ranging
from the apparently least consequential features to the most compelling, intracta-
ble aspects, Professor Wright perspicaciously anticipated the manifestation and
development of complications, facilitated comprehension of those problems that
did arise, and crafted elegant solutions for the difficulties. Charles Alan Wright,
therefore, richly deserves the encomium bestowed on the scholar's illustrious
predecessor, Professor James William Moore, by Professor Robert Cover: "His
treatise has kept before the profession a vision of the Federal Rules as a coherent
structure; at the same time it has embraced the flexibility of application which lets
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1. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999). Professor Wright
apparently edited every word in the treatise. Douglas Laycock, Charles Alan Wright and the University
of Texas School of Law, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 367, 373 (1997); Interview with Steve Morris and Kris Pick-
ering, in Las Vegas, Nev. (July 8, 2000).
2. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Celebration of Charles Alan Wright, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1586
(1998) (citations omitted). He served for eighteen years on the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure and for three years on the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Id. at
1582.
3. Id. at 1583; see also id. at 1582 (stating that, were she limited to ten books on her "'see every-
day' stand in chambers, Wright on Federal Courts would be among them"); Richard D. Freer, Gladly
Wolde He Lerne, and Gladly Teche, 73 TEX. L. REV. 957 (1995) (book review) (praising the fifth edition of
Wright on Federal Courts).
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them serve so many ends.
'A
Charles Alan Wright carefully identified and assiduously attempted to clar-
ify myriad, untidy complications in federal practice and procedure; the quintes-
sential example of this effort is the proliferation of local procedures that govern
practice before the appeals and district courts.5 In fact, three and a half dec-
ades ago, Professor Wright trenchantly denominated local strictures, especially
provisions that conflict with the federal rules and congressional legislation, as
the "soft underbelly" of federal practice and procedure. 6 The mid-1960s tim-
ing of the scholar's description accentuates his prescience. Professor Wright's
salient prediction of the problems that would result antedated the caseload ex-
plosion that has transformed the appellate and district courts over the last genera-
tion as well as preceded the steady expansion of local measures that gradually
fractured and ultimately balkanized federal practice and procedure.
During 1965, Charles Alan Wright initially emphasized the potential difficul-
ties that multiplying local requirements might create. Thereafter, his one-volume
and multi-volume treatises meticulously and incisively analyzed the "threat to the
integrity of the Civil Rules [that] has come from the proliferation of local rules for
particular districts." 7 Professor Wright comprehensively traced the rather obscure
origins and exponential growth of local mandates. Although the scholar acknowl-
edged that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 (as well as the analogous na-
tional provisos that cover admiralty, appellate, bankruptcy, criminal and eviden-
tiary practice) specifically authorizes the appeals and district courts to adopt
local rules, he tellingly cautioned that the drafters contemplated "these would
be few in number and confined to purely housekeeping matters." 8 Despite the
drafters' vision, local measures have dramatically increased and have become
ubiquitous; thus, they currently regulate numerous, important activities that
4. Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE
L.J. 718, 718 (1975). See generally JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938).
5. He typically emphasized local district civil rules. However, local procedures cover admiralty,
appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidentiary practice as well. They also range across a broad
spectrum from formal, "substantive" published rules, including one that reduces civil jury size, to in-
formal, unwritten practices of individual judges that regulate matters in specific courtrooms, such as
when motions are heard. I employ the terms in their broadest senses and interchangeably, but I empha-
size the written rules of civil procedure applied by the ninety-four districts.
6. Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966
DUKE L.J. 1011, 1012 n.6 (citing a letter from Charles Alan Wright to the editors of the Duke Law Jour-
nal (Nov. 16, 1965)); see also Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14
REv. LITIG. 1, 10 (1994) (remarking on the "phrase that has since been much quoted").
7. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 431 (5th ed. 1994); 12 WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 1, §§ 3152-3154. I rely here on both treatises; for convenience, I principally cite the one-
volume work. For the pre-1966 history, see Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2011-18 (1989).
8. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 431; see also Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disun-
ionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 944-51 (1996); Subrin, supra note 7, at 2013-16; Carl
Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PIr L. REv. 801, 807 (1995); Note, Rule 83 and the Local
Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1255-57 (1967).
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extend far beyond the circumscribed area of quotidian court administration. 9 The
resulting inexorable expansion of local commands alone jeopardizes "uniformity
of procedure throughout the country," while local provisions frequently consti-
tute a set of pitfalls for unwary attorneys who participate in litigation before
multiple appellate or district courts.10 Moreover, the "casual manner" of the local
mechanisms' prescription has strikingly contrasted with the attention that the fed-
eral rule revision entities have devoted to the amendment process. l
Professor Wright also perceptively recounted a series of unsatisfactory re-
sponses to the disadvantages, such as unwarranted expense and delay, that bur-
geoning local requirements have imposed. Two early responses that apparently
had promise proved fruitless. First, the Supreme Court's 1960 admonition that
judges not employ local rules to introduce "basic procedural innovations"'
12
seemingly heartened Wright. However, the potential of this pronouncement
was undermined when the Court subsequently stamped its imprimatur on a lo-
cal rule that reduced the size of civil juries from twelve to six members.1 3 The
second apparently promising development was the federal judiciary's invalida-
tion, through litigation, of many local provisions that instituted fundamental
procedural reforms or that contravened the Constitution, the federal rules, or
Acts of Congress. When analyzing this phenomenon, however, the scholar in-
sightfully hastened to warn that parties have never challenged a plethora of ad-
ditional questionable local strictures and these accordingly remain in force.
14
Professor Wright believed that several, comparatively recent, attempts to
rectify or ameliorate the complications that local procedural proliferation en-
9. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 431. See generally COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL
RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE (1989); Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Prolif-
eration of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-24 (1997); Tobias, supra note
8, at 809-10, 814-16.
10. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 431-32; see also Woodham v. Am. Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d
551, 552 (5th Cir. 1964) (mentioning the possible traps because of multiple rules).
11. FED. R. CIv. P. 83, 1985 amend., advisory committee note, 105 F.R.D. 225, 226 (1985) (ana-
lyzing the local rule revision process); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improve-
ments Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1627-29 (1994) (comparing the federal and local rule revision enti-
ties); Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, I GA. L. REV. 563, 565-
66 (1967) (describing the federal rule revision process).
12. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960). See generally 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, §
3153, at 517-20 (describing the Court's reasoning in Miner and subsequent cases); The Supreme Court,
1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 112-15 (1960) (detailing Miner); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experi-
ments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1574-75 (1991) (presenting examples
of the Court's invalidating basic procedural innovations).
13. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); see also 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3153, at 520-
23; Carrington, supra note 8, at 950-55; cf Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) (overturning a local rule
denying lawyers who were neither residing nor working in Louisiana access to the bar).
14. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 432 (citations omitted); see also Levin, supra note 12, at 1576.
See generally Subrin, supra note 7, at 2019-26 (listing local rules conflicting with national rules); To-
bias, supra note 8, at 814-16 (describing how local rules that conflict with national rules have prolifer-
ated).
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tails, have proven no more effective than the earlier actions. 15 These efforts
encompassed Supreme Court promulgation of the 1985 and 1995 amendments
to the applicable national provisos, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83,
which govern local practice,' 6 and congressional passage of the 1988 Judicial Im-
provements and Access to Justice Act. 17 The national rule revisions and the
statute requested that the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Circuit
Judicial Councils review and abrogate or modify local appellate and district court
measures determined to conflict or be redundant. 18 A closely-related, also un-
availing endeavor was the Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project. This
Project systematically scrutinized the local mandates that all thirteen appeals
and 94 district courts had adopted before 1989 and "identified hundreds of in-
stances in which local rules are inconsistent with the national rules or are other-
wise of questionable validity."'
19
Nevertheless, Professor Wright expressed disappointment that the hopes "for
progress in dealing with local rules... were dashed by the unnecessary and
unwise Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.,, 20 This statute encouraged each fed-
eral district court to implement local techniques for decreasing cost and delay,
many of which contradicted or reiterated provisions applied in the remaining
districts, the federal rules, and legislation.21 The Civil Justice Reform Act
compounded already substantial fragmentation; this fragmentation was further
exacerbated when the 1993 amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
15. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 432; Wright, supra note 6, at 10; see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 12-14.
16. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 83, 1985 amend., advisory committee. note, 105 F.R.D. 225, 227 (1985);
see also 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3152, at 499, 502-05; Tobias, supra note 8, at 817; cf FED.
R. APP. P. 47, 1995 amend., 514 U.S. 1142, 1143 (1995); FED. R. Civ. P. 83, 1995 amend., 514 U.S.
1157 (1995); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57, 1985 amend., advisory committee. note, 105 F.R.D. 179, 201 (1985).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(c) (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 27 (1988). For de-
scriptions of the 1998 Act, see generally Carrington, supra note 8, at 951-52; Tobias, supra note 11, at
1600-01. The 1995 federal rule amendments "codified" the mandates in the 1988 Judicial Improvements
Act and subjected local measures that repeat federal rules or congressional legislation to review and
modification. Supra note 16.
18. Sources cited supra notes 16-17; see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (authorizing the Judicial
Conference as the policymaking arm of the federal courts and prescribing its duties, which include re-
view of appellate procedures); id. § 332 (authorizing the Councils as policynaking entities in the ap-
peals courts and prescribing their duties, which include review of district court procedures).
19. Wright, supra note 6, at 10; see also Subrin, supra note 7, at 2020-26; sources cited supra note
8. The Project performed an exhaustive study that yielded revealing results on which little action has
been taken. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 28 (praising the Project's "valuable work").
20. Wright, supra note 6, at 10; see also Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between
Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (1994) (concluding that the CJRA dangerously nar-
rows our perception of procedural justice); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) (arguing that the CJRA is not constitutional). But see Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285 (1994) (arguing
that the CJRA is constitutional and justified to reduce caseloads).
21. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 62, at 432; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The
Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 763-74 (1995); Lauren Robel, Fractured
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1455-72 (1994); Carl Tobias,
Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 585-90; Wright, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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explicitly empowered every district court to prescribe variations on certain na-
tional provisos covering discovery or to reject those commands completely.
22
Therefore, as Professor Wright surveyed the "federal rulemaking scene," he ob-
served the increased inconsistency engendered by the synergy between the 1990
Civil Justice Reform Act and the 1993 revisions in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; this disuniformity inevitably reminded him of Sir Edward Grey's
1914 remark about World War I: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we
shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."
23
The sad passing of Charles Alan Wright means that he will never see the
lamp of consistency lit. However, the darkness need not endure. It would be a
fitting tribute to the memory of Charles Alan Wright if those responsible for
maintaining and nurturing uniform federal practice and procedure could halt
balkanization altogether or at least slow additional fragmentation. For example,
particular appeals and district courts as well as individual judges might seize
the initiative by canvassing their own local measures and abolishing or chang-
ing provisions deemed to be in conflict or repetitive. More specifically, districts
could eliminate any remaining inconsistent or redundant mechanisms adopted
24pursuant to the ostensibly-expired Civil Justice Reform Act. The Judicial Con-
ference and the Circuit Judicial Councils might correspondingly complete the
local procedural review that the 1985 and 1995 federal rules revisions and the
1988 Judicial Improvements Act require, while lawmakers should budget suf-
ficient resources to facilitate discharge of the duties imposed. 25
There is one final idea that can be implemented, but Congress is the appro-
priate branch to authorize the action. This would be to resurrect a 1991 pro-
posed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, one that the rule revi-
sors withdrew out of apparent deference to the contemporaneous expense and
22. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), (b)(2), 1993 amend. See generally Chemerinsky & Friedman,
supra note 21, at 775-78 (describing the variations resulting from Rule 26). The 2000 amendments, which
the Supreme Court recently promulgated, essentially eliminate the "opt-out" provisions. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(1), (b)(2), 2000 amend., advisory committee note, 192 F.R.D. 384-85, 391 (2000). See generally
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals,
52 SMU L. REV. 229, 236-37 (1999) (describing the Advisory Committee proposal that led to the 2000
amendments).
23. Wright, supra note 6, at 11; see also Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abro-
gation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 49 (1994) (criticizing the Advisory
Committee's justifications for Rule 26 and arguing for a more coherent vision of national procedural
goals). But see Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (describing the Advisory Committee's reasoning and the background to
Rule 26 and arguing for a new commitment to the principle of judicial rulemaking).
24. E.g., D. MONT. R. 105-2; D. NEV. R. IB 2-2; D. OR. R. 72.1; see also Hajek v. Burlington
Northern R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105 (1999). See generally Carl Tobias, Did the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998) (arguing that Congress or the Judicial
Conference should proclaim that the CJRA has expired to force districts to eliminate CJRA-related
mechanisms); supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
25. Supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see also Levin, supra note 12, at 1576-79; Carl To-
bias, Some Realism About Federal Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 76, 79 (1997).
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26delay reduction effort instituted under the Civil Justice Reform Act. The
suggested modification would empower federal district courts to experiment
for not more than five years with local strictures that contradict or duplicate the
federal rules or congressional statutes, if they secure Judicial Conference ap-
proval. 27 That approach should prove efficacious, principally because the al-
teration recommended strikes a carefully-calibrated balance. The proposal
would foster uniformity while affording the requisite flexibility to experiment
with promising devices and to develop felicitous solutions for peculiar local diffi-
culties that the federal rules often do not resolve.
28
The recent death of Charles Alan Wright is a grievous loss for everyone who is
affected by, works in, or writes about federal practice and procedure. All of the
actions suggested above would honor Professor Wright by reversing the balkani-
zation that he decried and by restoring a measure of consistency to modem federal
practice that local procedural proliferation now seriously threatens.
29
26. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Proposed Rules:
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) (proposing the amendment to Rule 83(b)); see also A. Leo Levin, Beyond Tech-
niques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 877, 891-92 (1993); Tobias, supra note 11, at 1616.
27. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 26. For an earlier proposal that would
have authorized experimentation for two years with conflicting measures upon Circuit Judicial Council
approval, see Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 370-73 (1983);
see also Levin, supra note 12, at 1582-83; Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal
for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
28. In fairness, the federal judiciary may have applied conflicting or redundant local strictures to
experiment, to address unusual local complications, or to treat rising dockets. However, the ideas that I
proffer would be responsive to these needs and to the difficulties that local procedural proliferation cre-
ates. See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L.
REv. 853 (1989); see also Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 21, at 783-91; Levin, supra note 26, at
888-94; Tobias, supra note 25, at 68, 72-73.
29. John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1883,
1898 (1989) (characterizing proliferation as a "gross affliction"); Subrin, supra note 7, at 2011 (characteriz-
ing proliferating procedures as "wild flowers"); see also Levin, supra note 12, at 1568-69.
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